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ISSUES PRESENTED IN RESPONDENTS' BRIEF
I.

ARE ATTORNEY FEES AWARD FOR THE DEFENDANT APPROPRIATE
UNDER Rivas v, K C. Logging, 134 Idaho 603, (July 25, 2000) WHEN NO
EVIDENCE OR ARGUMENTS ARE PRESENTED TO ESTABLISH BAD FAITH
OR IMPROPER PURPOSE

II. COULD THE COMMISSION JUST AS EASILY HAVE FOUND THAT
APPELLANT FAILED TO GIVE TIMELY NOTICE OF THE ACCIDENT

ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL BY APPELLANT
I.

DID THE REFEREE AND THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION ERR AS A
MATTER OF LAW OR ABUSE THEIR DISCRETION WHEN THE CLAIMANT
WAS REFUSED TO PROVIDER A COMPLETE COPY OF THE AGENCY
RECORD TO CLAIMANT AND REFUSED TO AUGMENT THE RECORD?

II.

DID THE REFEREE AND THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION ERR AS A
MATTER OF LAW OR ABUSE THEIR DISCRETION WHEN THEY DENIED
ADMISSION OF CLAIMANT-APPELLANT'S MEDICAL RECORDS, WHICH
WERE CREATED IN THE HIS NATIVE LANGUAGE, IN VIOLATION OF
IDAHO JUDICIAL RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE lOG AND
IDAHO RULES OF EVIDENCE?

III.

DID THE REFEREE AND THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION ERR AS A
MATTER OF LAW OR ABUSE THEIR DISCRETION WHEN THEY DENIED
THE ADMISSION OF CLAIMANT-APPELLANT'S MEDICAL RECORDS,
WHICH WERE CREATED IN THE HIS NATIVE LANGUAGE, UNLESS
CLAIMANT COULD AFFORD A CERTIFIED TRANSLATION IN VIOLATION
OF CLAIMANT-APPELLANT'S STATE AND FEDERAL EQUAL
PROTECTION AND DUE PROCESS RIGHTS?

IV.

DID THE REFEREE AND THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION ERR AS A
MATTER OF LAW OR ABUSE THEIR DISCRETION WHEN THEY
WITHDREW CLAIMANT'S COURT APPOINTED TRANSLATOR AND
REFUSED TO ALLOW THE COURT INTERPRETER TO ORALL Y
TRANSLATE THE REMAINDER EXHIBITS AFTER CLAIMANT WITHDREW
VARIOUS RECORDS TO LIMIT THE NUMBER OF DOCUMENTS TO
TRANSLATE IN VIOLATION OF CLAIMANT'S STATE AND FEDERAL

SUBSTANTIVE AND PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS RlGHTS?
V.

DID THE REFEREE AND THE INDUSTRlAL COMMISSION ERR AS A
MATTER OF LAW OR ABUSE THEIR DISCRETION WHEN THEY FAILED
TO GRANT THE RELIEF REQUESTED IN CLAIMANT-APPELLANT'S FIRST
AND SECOND VERIFIED MOTION FOR SANCTIONS WHICH REQUESTED
SANCTIONS OR AN ORDER TO COMPEL FILED ON OR ABOUT THE FIRST
OF SEPTEMBER 2011 AND THE ASSOCIATED ORDERS ON MOTION
DATED NOVEMBER 4,2011 AND FILED ON OR ABOUT THE 23 RD OF
NOVEMBER2011 ?

VI.

DID THE COMMISSION ABUSE THEIR DISCRETION AND/OR LACK
COMPETENT
EVIDENCE
WHEN
THEY
SUBSTANTIAL
AND
DETERMINED THAT THE CLAIMANT/APPELLANT DID NOT PROVDE
THAT HE SUFFERED A WORK-RELATED ACCIDENT WHILE PICKING
APPLES FOR CORRAL AGRlCUTURE AT WILLIAM'S ORCHARDS ON OR
ABOUT SEPTEMBER 10, 20107

2

ISSUES PRESENTED IN RESPONDENTS' BRIEF
I.

ATTORNEY FEES SHOULD NOT BE AWARDED FOR THE DEFENDANT
APPROPRIATE UNDER RIVAS V. K. C. LOGGING, 134 Idaho 603, (July 25,
2000) WHEN NO EVIDENCE OR ARGUMENTS ARE PRESENTED TO
ESTABLISH BAD FAITH OR IMPROPER PURPOSE
A. Idaho Law Regarding Attorney Fees in Workers Compensation
The court addressed the standards it would apply in detennining whether or not to

award attorney's fees against a Claimant in the case of Rivas v, K. C. Logging, 134 Idaho
603, (July 25, 2000) where the court stated:
Generally, this court does not award attorney's fees in appeals by Claimants from
decisions of the Industrial Commission. Idaho Code §72-1375(2) ("No individual
claiming benefits shall be charged fees or costs of any kind in any proceeding
under this Chapter. .. by any court or any officer thereof, except that a court may
assess costs if the court determines that the' proceedings have been instituted or
continued without reasonable ground."); Teevan v. Office a/the Attorney General,
130 Idaho 79, 34-55, 936 P.2d 1321, 1326-27 (1997).

Where legitimate issues exist, this court has declined to award attorney's fees in
Claimant's appeal from the Industrial Commission. See Bullard v. Sun Valley
Aviation, Inc., 128 Idaho 430, 435, 914 P.2d 564, 569 (1996). Even where
substantial and competent evidence exists and the Claimant mounts a factuallybased appeal, this court imposes sanctions pursuant to Idaho Appellate Rule
11.1 only if the appellants' arguments are "made in bad faith" or "interposed
for any improper purpose." Tupper v. State Farm Insurance, 131 Idaho 724, 731,
963 P.2d 1161, 1168 (1998). [emphasis added]
Respondents are of the position that they are entitled to fees due to the allegation
that Appellant's brief was merely a request to, "reconsider the testimony and evidence and
call into question and review the credibility determinations of the Industrial Commission."
(Respondents' Brief, p. 34).

Respondents interpreted Rivas incorrectly as the

3

Respondents' arguments imply that attorney's fees are awarded for any and all cases if
Appellant's brief addresses the credibility determinations. The court in Stevens-McAtee v.
Potlatch Corp., 145 Idaho 325 (2008) not only denied claims for fees and costs by the
Respondent regarding McAtee's appeal regarind a request to reconsider the testimony and
evidence and call into question and review the credibility determinations of the Industrial
Commission, the Court even reversed the ruling and finding of the referee decision
regarding credibility IN FAVOR of the Claimant when it found that the Commission's
findings on McAtee's substantive credibility were not supported by substantial and
competent evidence.
Respondents' claim for attorney's fees also fails as there is no evidence, records, or
arguments on what grounds are used to establish that the Appeal herein was made "in bad
faith" or "interposed for any improper purpose".
Respondent did allege that Appellant, "misrepresented what transpired" regarding
withdrawal of the translator. (Respondent's Brief, pp. 35). The record is supportive of
Appellant's argument that the Industrial Commission withdrew the translator when it
refused to allow Appellant the use of the translator to translate of the medical records in
violation ofldaho Court Administrative Rule 52 and Idaho Code 9-205.
Respondents also interpreted Appellant's appeal incorrectly. Appellant does not
merely ask the Supreme Court to reweigh substantial evidence of various witnesses or

4

direct evidence that contradicted Appellant's evidence.

Appellant's case presents

substantial questions of law, policy, and Constitutional issues including:
1. The Industrial Commission's failure to honor the Order to Compel previously

granted and or to grant Appellant's relief regarding discovery and sanctions
against the Respondent for \\tithholding and failing to provide discovery before
the hearing, including, but not limited to the current address, current i-9,
current employment records of the employees that were working with
Appellant during the week of the accident.
2. The Industrial Commission's failure to grant Appellant's relief regarding
Respondent Employer's failure to appear at their first deposition and failure to
appear at the hearing in letter, via telephone, or in person after receiving a
Subpoena Issued by the Industrial Commission.
3. The Industrial Commission's disregard for Idaho Judicial Rules of Practice and
Procedure 10 G by disallowing Appellant's medical records because they were
created in Spanish, despite Rule lOG allowing the admissibility of "Any
medical report(s)" without any exclusions.
4. The Referee and Industrial Commission's requirement that the cost and burden
to provide the certified translation of his medical records of Appellant that were
created in Spanish, the native language of the Appellant.
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5. The temporary withdrawal of the court appointed Spanish Translator by not
allowing the translator to translate the medical records.
6. The violation of the United States Constitution, Amendments 5 and 14; and
Idaho State Constitution, Article 1, Sections 13 and 18 by expressly and or
impliedly creating an unnecessary burden or treatment of minorities.
7. The Industrial Commission's decision to refuse to provide Appellant a copy of
the exhibits and obtain such at his individual cost and time in violation of Idaho
Appellate Rules 28- 29.
8. The Industrial Commission's decision to refuse to provide Appellant a copy of
access to the audio recording of the hearings on the 10th of January 2012 and
the 2nd of March 2012 in violation of Idaho Appellate Rules 28-29 which
prevented Appellant to augment the record and provide additional transcripts of
the Industrial Commission's "New Rule" created at the hearing to require
medical records only in English. Rule 10 H( 1) of JRP requires the parties to
request hearing transcript, and arguably the hearing audio, directly from the
Commission; thereby preventing direct access from the court reporter.
prohibits the' parties from requesting the transcript, and arguabley also, the
audio, from the
B. An Award of Attorney Fee is Inappropriate Because the Elements of Idaho
Rules of Civil Procedure ll(a)(l) and 54(e)(1) are not met.

6

Respondent further states that Counsel for Appellant violated Idaho Rules of Civil
Procedure Rule 11(a)(1) which requires four elements namely that 1: Appellant's Appeal
is not well grounded in fact, 2: is not warranted by existing law, 3: is not for a good faith
argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law, AND 4: that it is
interposed for an improper purpose.

Respondent also argues Appellant violated Idaho

Rule of Civil Procedure 54(e)(1) which alleges that the Appeal was brought, pursued or
defended frivolously, unreasonably or without foundation.

(Respondent's Brief, pp. 34-

36).
Respondent's Brief did not specifically address how all the four elements above
were violated, if any at all, by Counsel for the Appellant.

The only insight into the

concerns found is when Respondent argued that Counsel for Appellant should pay
Respondent's attorney fees because Appellant is merely asking the Supreme Court to
merely, "reconsider the testimony and evidence and call into question and review the
credibility determinations of the Industrial Commission" under Talbot v. Ames Const., 127
Idaho 648 (1995) (Respondent's Brief, p. 34); however, such standard misapplies the law
and four elements required above and clarified in Rivas v, K. C. Logging, 134 Idaho 603,
(July 25, 2000). Therefore, counsel herein is unable to address in detail and with any
additional specificity that was outlined above.
First, Appellant incorporates the arguments made above and in Appellants opening
brief that the factual assertions made herein are based on the record, support the claims of
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the Appellant, and warrant the appeal herein. Second, the law cited and provided herein
and Appellant's opening brief supports the claims made in the Appeal. Third, Appellant
has the right and is exercising his right to modifY or reverse the Industrial Commission's
"New Rule" of only admitting medical records provided in English despite the statute
allowing "Any" medical records. Fourth, Counsel herein certifies under penalty of perjury
that no motive was present other than to correct the findings and rulings made by the
Industrial Commission that affected the Appellant and will affect hundreds of current and
future clients of Counsel herein. The Respondents' Brief, again, does not clarifY what
"improper purpose" is alleged by Respondent herein.
Counsel for the Respondent is in-house counsel and therefore the Respondent will
not incur any additional costs and therefore is in axiomatic to imply that Counsel for
Appellant is pursuing this matter for any delay or to increase costs for the Respondent.
Respondent finally specifically alleged that Appellant, "misrepresented what
transpired" regarding withdrawal of the translator. (Respondent's Brief, pp. 35). The
record is supportive of Appellant's argument that the Industrial Commission withdrew the
translator when it refused to allow Appellant the use of the translator to translate of the
medical records in violation ofIdaho Court Administrative Rule 52 and Idaho Code 9-205.
C. Talbot v. Ames Const.

Talbot is not applicable and distinguished from the Appellant. Ames Construction

presented three doctors who testified against Talbot and Talbot presented one doctor that
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testified in his favor. The Supreme Court explained the grounds for attorney fees against
Talbot and stated that Talbot's single argument on appeal is to reweigh the credibility of

the three doctors who disagreed with his single doctor and that,
No argument is made by Talbot that the Commission's findings are not supported
by substantial, competent evidence in the record. In fact, at oral argument before
this Court, the attorney for Talbot admitted without exception that the record
contains substantial, competent evidence to support the Commission's
findings. [emphasis added]
Talbot v. Ames Canst., 127 Idaho 648, 650 (1995).

The Supreme Court further clarified the holding for the attorney fees award as the
evidence reflected because,
Three of the four physicians who examined Talbot concluded that there was no
causal connection between the September 1991 incident and Talbot's condition.
The one physician who believed that it was probable that the September 1991
injury was the cause of Talbot's condition was found to be less credible by the
Commission. The Commission relied upon the opinions of the three physicians
who testified that there was no causal connection between the September 1991
incident and Talbot's condition.
Id.
"The Commission concluded that while some incident did occur, the
preponderance of the medical evidence established that the event did not cause an injury
nor did it cause or aggravate Talbot's condition." Id.
Unlike Talbot, the Appellant here is not asking the court to discount the testimony
of three medical professionals who disagreed with Appellant's one doctor. Appellant's
case herein is to address the legal issues outlined above. The sole issue decided by the
Industrial Commission herein was whether Appellant suffered a work related injury on or
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about the 10th of September 20lO.

Appellant provided direct evidence that was not

contradicted by any direct evidence namely:
1. Appellant underwent Physical Therapy wherein Mark Colin, LPT, gave the
opinion letter on the January 4, 2012 that Mr. Fonseca's condition and
treatment was "highly likely" caused by his fall from the ladder on September
10, 2010, and that Mr. Fonseca's work restrictions continued from December
15,2010 to the date ofthe letter. (C9:114 - 117).
2. Appellant underwent an MRI on the February 24, 3011 due to low back pain
extending into the lower extremities, which demonstrated disk bulging at L5
and L4 - L5. (C5:46 - 47).
3. Appellant was working for the Respondent on September 10, 2010 picking
apples from a ladder as reflected in Mr. Fonseca's drawing documented in his
deposition exhibit and C16 and C17; fell off a ladder while picking apples;
landing on his gluteus, and hurt his feet, hip, and back to his neck (T.R. 74: 17 76:5).
4. That that there were approximately five or six people present when he fell;
(T.H. 76: 10- 13);

5. Roberto "Tito" Corral, Jr. did not perform any investigation into Mr. Fonseca's
accident. (T.R. 318:13 - 319:1); (Deposition of Roberto Corral, Jr. 29:14 - 25).
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6. Mr. Corral did not attempt to contact any of the witnesses that were working on
the September 10, 2010 even though about half of them remained in his
employ. (T.H. 321:1- 18)
7. The Respondent employer failed to locate and present testimony of coworkers
that were working on the September 10, 2010 to contradict the signed letters
provided by Nazario Marquez and Bruno Aguilar that supports Appellant's
testimony. (C19:1 - 6).
8. Respondent employer, Mr. Coral did not attempt to contact Nazario Marquez
or Bruno Aguilar after receiving thir signed letters witnesses. (T.H. 322:4 15)
9. Appellant notified Respondent employer Roberto Corral Sr. (President) of the
accident who relocated the Appellant to light duty work due to the accident.
(T.H. 85:21- 86:20).
10. Respondent employer Roberto Corral Sr. advanced Appellant for medical costs
associated with the accident that occurred on or about the 10th of September
2010. (T.R. 83:13-16).
11. Respondent employer Mr. Coronado did not start working at the Williamson
Orchard until the September 17 or 18,2010, one week after the accident. (T.H.
291:1-13)(CI5;5:10 - 18)
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12. Appellant's coworkers continued working for various days at the site of the
accident. However, Mr. Fonseca did not work at the Williamson Orchard after
September 10,2010. (Claimant's Exhibit 12 Deposition page 13 lines 3 - 20),
(hereinafter "CI2; 13:3 - 20"); (C20; 1 - 12 of Deposition of Roger
Williamson).
13. Mr. Fonseca reported to the Emergency Room on visits after December 2010
including January 7, and June 27,2011, and presented continuing complaints of
pain regarding the work injury of September 2010. These complaints included
hip pain down to the bottom of his foot and issued pain medication. (C7:82 84; C8:97 - 112)
14. Appellant's medical records on February 2, 2011 reflect a diagnosis of low
back pain with left radiculopathy status post falling from a ladder. Mr. Fonseca
demonstrates symptoms consistent with a lumbar derangement with unilateral
or asymmetrical symptoms below the knee. Mr. Fonseca also demonstrated
complication with the low back, foot, calf, thigh, buttock etc. (C6:58) and such
symptoms and complications despite treatment for over two weeks (C6:52, 54 62,64 - 66).
15. Sarai and Ana Fonseca's testimony that Appellant notified them of the accident
the day it happened and experienced and demonstrated symptoms consistent
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with the fall starting the 10th of September 2010 (T.H. 167:18 - 170:25) and
(T.R. 175:20 - 176:16; TH 187:15 - 17).
16. Mr. Roger Williamson, the President of the orchard and the contractor of
Respondent employer herein, recalled being notified on the September 10,
2010 by John Williamson, the Vice President, regarding an accident that month
which involved a worker of Corral who slipped off the ladder, that the worker
didn't want to work on the ladder anymore, that there was no more work
available, and the worker's supervisor sent him somewhere else. (T.H.206:14
- 22; 213:4 - 15: 214: 16 - 23); During a conversation "With the vice president, he
recalled speaking telephonically with John Williamson regarding a worker who
was likely Hispanic that had an accident in September 2010.

(T.H. 207:16 -

209:5). Mr. Williamson further testified that John Williamson told him this
worker was injured on the foot and was instructed to go home to see if he
would get better and return if he felt better the next day. (T.H. 210: 1 - 211 :5).
Williamson Orchard records reflect that Mr. Fonseca worked up until
September 10, 2010 and did not work after September 10, 2010 (CI2; 13:3 20).
17. Mr. Williamson stated that an Hispanic person from Mr. Corral's crew was
injured in September 2010 by slipping off a ladder and was instructed to go
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home to see if he would get better. (C12; 16:1 - 16) (C12; 20:3) (C12; 24:21 25).
18. John Williamson testified that was the co-owner and manager of the field
operations of Williamson Orchard and responsible to supervise crews; (T .H.
239:12 - 15). Further, Mr. Williamson testified that he was present during his
brother Roger Williamson's testimony and that such testimony was truthful.
(T.H. 239:22 - 240:2).
Appellant therefore asks this court to deny Respondents' request for fees and costs
and grant Appellant fees and costs to Appellant, under the same law cited by Respondent,
as the case law cited above does not support the arguments made by Respondents incurring
additional time and resources to protect Appellant and his counsel herein.
II.

THE COMMISSION COULD NOT JUST AS EASILY HAVE FOUND THAT
APPELLANT FAILED TO GIVE TIMELY NOTICE OF THE ACCIDENT

Respondents herein argue that timely notice was lacking and therefore any error was
de minimus as the Industrial Commission would have denied the claim anyways; however,
Respondents failed to provide evidence or testimony to contradict or refute Appellant's
evidence of the following:
1. Appellant gave oral notice to Roberto Corral, Sr. (President) and Luisa Corral
(Secretary) within two weeks of the accident (T.H. 81:21 - 83:4), who then
transferred Appellant to another site to perform lighter duty work throwing leaves
into a grinder for a couple weeks (T.H. 85:21 - 86:20). Oral notice is sufficient for
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workers' compensation purposes to provide the employer actual notice of the
injury.

I.e.

§ 72-701. Tonahill v. LeGrand Johnson Canst. Co., 1998, 963 P.2d

1174, 131 Idaho 737
2. Roberto Corral, Sr. gave Mr. Fonseca $200.00 cash for medical expenses due to
the accident; (T.R. 83:13-16) therefore, pursuant to IC 72-701, the notice
requirement is waived due to voluntary payment and acknowledged the accident
and notice thereof. Mr. Facer received previous payments for benefits prior to the
insurer and adjuster obtaining the case. The Court held that the previous,
"[p]ayment was compensation for injuries for which claimant's employer admits
liability and must be considered, in substance, as compensation paid by the
employer. By making this payment claimant's employer through its surety tolled
the statute of limitations and bound the appellant to his act. Facer v. E. R. Steed
Equipment Co., 95 Idaho 608, 613 (Idaho 1973)

3. Appellant, approximately one month after the accident, also gave written notice
to Roberto Corral, Sr. (T.R. 83:23 - 84:4).
4. Respondents admitted that no prejudice occurred by the lack of notice as they
failed to or attempt to investigate or locate witnesses to the accident. Roberto
Corral, Jr. did not perform any investigation into Mr. Fonseca's accident and would
not have done any different investigation if Mr. Fonseca had notified him of the
accident on November 1, 2010.

(TR 318:13 - 319:1; Deposition of Roberto

15

Corral, Jr. 29:14 - 25). Additionally, Mr. Corral, Jr. did not attempt to contact any
of the witnesses that were working on the September 10, 2010 even though about
half of them still work for him. (TH 321:1 - 18). After notice was acknowledged
by Robero Corral, Jr. he did not attempt to contact these witnesses. (TH 322:4
15).

Finally, Mr. Coral testified that he did not believe any witness had

disappeared because the Mr. Fonseca allegedly waited 30 days and that the
company was not harmed by the alleged extra 30 days. (T.H. 345 :24 - 346: 1;
347:24 - 348:1). Therefore, notice was sufficient under Idaho Code 72-704 even if

it was given after 60 -days as no prejudice existed. See also McCoy v. Sunshine
Mining Co., 97 Idaho 675 (1976)

Appellant asks this Court to find that the errors made by the Industrial Commission
were not de minimus and deny the Respondent's requests above.
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ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL BY APPELLANT

VII.

THE COMMISSION ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW OR ABUSED
ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT REFUSED TO PROVIDE THE CLAIMANT
WITH A COMPLETE COpy OF THE AGENCY RECORD AND REFUSED
TO AUGMENT THE RECORD.

The Industrial Commission, after the commencement of the formal hearing for the
Appellant on the 10th of January 2012, took a recess, and in response to Appellant's
medical records being produced in their original form from the doctor in Spanish,
introduced a new rule that required all medical records to be in English or be attached by a
translation into English by a certified translator, at cost to the Appellant, and not
performed by a party or their counsel.
Appellant wished to augment the record of such New Rule by obtaining the audio
of the hearing, provide a transcript and augment the record with such "New Rule" for this
court. Unfortunately, Counsel was unable to obtain such audio directly from the court
reporter and the Industrial did not produce a copy of any of the audio of the hearing to
allow Appellant to augment the record.
Idaho Appellate Rule IAR 28(C) states that, "The clerk's or agency's record shall
also include all additional documents requested by any party in the notice of appeal, notice
of cross-appeal and requests for additional documents in the record." Appellant requested
that the audio and the exhibits be included and withheld. Idaho Appellate Rule 29(a)
states
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Upon the receipt of the reporter's transcript and upon completion of the clerk's
or agency's record, the clerk of the district court or administrative agency shall
serve copies of the reporter's transcript and clerk's or agency's record upon the
parties by serving one copy of the transcript and record on the appellant and one
copy of the transcript and record on the respondent.
Despite Appellant incurring and paying for the copy of the transcript and copies of
the entire record for the appeal, Appellant was also refused a copy of the exhibits
presented and admitted at the hearings. Appellant was required to incur the costs to travel
and the fees at the Idaho Supreme Court building on the 22 nd of May 2013. Appellant asks
this court to take judicial notice of such fees and transactions.
VIII.

THE REFEREE AND THE COMMISSION ERRED AS A MATTER
OF LAW OR ABUSED THEIR DISCRETION WHEN THEY DENIED
ADMISSION OF THE CLAIMANT/APPELLANT'S MEDICAL RECORDS
WHICH WERE CREATED IN HIS NATIVE LANGUAGE IN VIOLATION
OF IDAHO JUDICIAL RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 10 G
AND IDAHO RULES OF EVIDENCE.

Respondents' interpretation of lOG is not correct.

Statutory interpretation must be

interpreted in conjunction with statutes and prior decisions. Idaho Code 72-708 states the,

Process and procedure under this law shall be as summary and simple a reasonably
may be and as far as possible in accordance with the rules of equity.
Industrial Commission proceedings have been informal and designed for
simplicity; further, the primary purpose of these proceedings being the attainment of
justice in each individual case. Hagler v. Micron Technology, Inc., 118 Idaho 596 (1990).
"Proceedings under the Workmen's Compensation Law are designed to afford employees a
speedy, summary and simple remedy for the recovery of compensation for injuries
sustained in industrial accidents ... " Duggan v. Potlatch Forests, Inc., 92 Idaho 262, 263-
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64 (1968) see Brooks v. Duncan, 96 Idaho 579 (1975), see Hogaboom v. Econ. Mattress,
107 Idaho 13 (1984). The humane purposes which it serves leave no room for narrow,
technical construction. Ogden v. Thompson, 128 Idaho 87, 88,910 P.2d 759,760 (1996).
Further, the provisions of the Idaho Workers' Compensation Law are to be liberally
construed in favor of the employee. Haldiman v. American Fine Foods, 117 Idaho 955,
956, 793 P .2d 187, 188 (1990).
Idaho law and policy regarding workers compensation has long held the position to
err on the side of the employee and to admit evidence. Rule lOG of the JRP should be
interpreted in

co~unction

with the policy and law cited above and below and should not

be interpreted to construe that the employee should bear the additional burden and costs of
retaining a certified interpreter to present evidence at hearing.
Rule lOG of the JRP clarified that medical records are not excluded because they
are hearsay. At the time of the passage of Rule lOG, medical records were not admissible
in civil trial unless foundation and authenticity were established through a witness and
therefore lOG clarified that not authenticity and or foundation were required to save costs
to the Claimant.

Further, Administrative law allowed additional flexibility to allow

additional evidence not normally admissibility in a civil trial.
Also, Rule lOG of the JRP does not allow for the hearing officer to refuse
allowing the translator to translate the limited remaining medical records especially when
Appellant withdrew records to limit the time to translate the remaining medical records.

19

The hearing offer disallowed the translation by Counsel for the Appellant and the
appointed translator and therefore refusing the Appellant and Respondents to make
informed decisions on whether the records were relevant.
Finally, the inclusion of only Claimants, and most applicable herein, the inclusion
of only Minority Claimants for additional costs, are not the proper party to be the
recipients of additionally burdens of costs and expenses. Claimants, especially Minority
Claimants, are injured workers, unemployed, in debt for past medical bills, in collections
and or facing outside litigation, are without income to pay for the daily necessities and
needed treatment, let alone additional costs of translation of medical records. The case
herein involved the hearing officer's refusal to withdraw the appointed translator to
translate the remaining records in Spanish for a few minutes at the expense of the
Claimant and under the creation of the New Rule.

IX.

THE REFEREE AND THE COMMISSION ERRED AS A MATTER
OF LAW OR ABUSED THEIR DISCRETION WHEN THEY DENIED THE
ADMISSION OF THE CLAIMANT/APPELLANT'S MEDICAL RECORDS
WHICH WERE CREATED IN HIS NATIVE LANGUAGE UNLESS HE
COULD AFFORD A CERTIFIED TRANSLATION IN VIOLATION OF
THE CLAIMANT/APPELLANT'S STATE AND FEDERAL EQUAL
PROTECTION AND DUE PROCESS RIGHTS.
As cited above, Idaho Code 72-708 states that the

Process and procedure under this law shall be as summary and simple a reasonably
may be and as far as possible in accordance with the rules of equity.
Further, the provisions of the Idaho Workers' Compensation Law are to be liberally
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liberally construed in favor of the employee. Haldiman v. American Fine Foods, 117 Idaho
955, 956, 793 P.2d 187, 188 (1990). Therefore, in the event of the necessity to incur a
burden when a Claimant does not speak English, would be to liberally construe such
policy in his favor and not place the burden of translation upon him.
The Industrial Commission denied the Admissibility of Medical Records created
by Claimant's treating physician on the grounds that the treating physician created the
language in Claimant's native language of Spanish (January 10, 2012 Hearing: 72:16 73:18. See also Claimant's Exhibit 1, pages 4,5,6; Exhibit 6, page 54). The Referee and
Industrial Commission required the cost and burden to provide the certified translation
shall be borne by the claimant not the Commission (January 10,2012 Hearing 73:19-24).
This ruling was made despite previously stating that the Spanish Medical records were
admissible and acknowledging that the Referee and Industrial Commission appointed a
Spanish Translator who was present at the hearing, namely a Mercedes Lupercio.
(Hearing 4:6-13); January 10,2012 Hearing: "I will make note also that while we have the
benefit of our interpreter present today, I might have the interpreter interpret for us those
portions .... " (January 10, 2012 Hearing 24:4-6); However, Appellant's request for Mr.
Lupercio to translate the remaining records was denied.
The Equal Protection Clause proclaims that "No State shall ... deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S. Const. Amend. XIV, Sec. 1.
This rule of equal treatment does not depend on the existence of an underlying property
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right. Reserve, Ltd. v. Town of Longboat Key, 17 F.3d 1374, 1381 (lIth Cir.l994), cert.
denied, --- U.S. ----, 115 S.Ct. 729, 130 L.Ed.2d 633 (1995).
When a classification involves a "suspect class" or a minority, then a strict scrutiny
standard is used City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432, 439-42,
(1985). The United States Supreme Court in Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003)
recently upheld the above standards and clarified that an equal protection case can be held
and deemed unconstitutional when there is an denial of equal treatment that results from
the imposition of a barrier, but does not result in the ultimate inability to obtain benefits.
It is by now well established that "all racial classifications reviewable under the
Equal Protection Clause must be strictly scrutinized." Adarand Constructors, Inc.
v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 224 (1995). This" 'standard of review ... is not dependent
on the race of those burdened or benefited by a particular classification.' " Ibid.
(quoting Richmond v. J A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 494 (1989) (plurality
opinion)). Thus, "any person, of whatever race, has the right to demand that any
governmental actor subject to the Constitution justify any racial classification
subjecting that person to unequal treatment under the strictest of judicial
scrutiny." Adarand, 515 U.S., at 224.

Id. (See also Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U.S. 899,908 and Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S.
339, 343-344).

The standards of equal protection analysis have been recognized in

Idaho. Leliefeld v. Johnson, 104 Idaho 357 (1983). The United States Supreme Court in
Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) clarified that all government racial
classifications must be analyzed by a reviewing court under strict scrutiny, that race based
actions must be necessary to further a compelling governmental interest, that such actions
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and violate the Equal Protection Clause unless it is narrowly tailored to further that
interest, and that context matters when reviewing such action.
The requirement of the additional costs of non English speaking minorities also
would have a disparate impact upon all minorities. The Supreme Court of the United
States Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp, 429 U.S.
252 (1977) clarified that rule would be unconstitutional if it disproportionately impacted
one race, if the background of the official action involved prior decisions about race, the
sequence of events leading up to the decision and legislative history.
Claimant and other similarly situated minority non-English speaking Claimants'
rights are violated by the "new rule" in violation of both the state and federal constitutional
rights to substantive and procedural due process and equal protection when they adopted
the new policy of refusing to admit any medial records if it is in the language of the
Claimant's Spanish language or was unable to afford the additional cost and burden to
provide a certified translation of such.

This is especially true in following the recent

decision by the Industrial Commission in Serrano v. Four Season Framing; IC NO 2004507845 to disallow pennanent disability benefits for those who refuse to answer question
regarding their immigration status.
As previously cited, "The most certain test by which we judge whether a country is
really free is the amount of security enjoyed by minorities." -Lord Acton (John E. E.
Dalberg Acton) English historian, statesman (1834-1902).

"Our courts are the great

levelers." Roughly paraphrasedfrom the movie, "To Kill a Mockingbird"
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X.

THE REFEREE AND THE COMMISSION ERRED AS A MATTER
OF LAW OR ABUSED THEIR DISCRETION WHEN THEY WITHDREW
THE CLAIMANT/APPELLANT'S COURT-APPOINTED TRANSLATOR
AND REFUSED TO ALL THE COURT INTERPRETER TO ORALLY
TRANSLATE EXHIBITS WRITTEN IN HIS NATIVE LANGUAGE IN
VIOLATION OF THE CLAIMANT/APPELLANT'S STATE AND
FEDERAL SUBSTANTIVE AND PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS RIGHTS.

Respondents did not address the Industrial Commission's decision to temporarily
withdraw the court appointed translator and not allow him to translate the records herein,
therefore not additional arguments are cited here other than to incorporate the arguments
made above.

XI.

THE REFEREE AND THE COMMISSION ERRED AS A MATTER
OF LAW OR ABUSED THEIR DISCRETION WHEN THEY FAILED TO
GRANT THE RELIEF REQUESTED IN THE CLAIMANT/APPELLANT'S
FIRST AND SECOND VERIFIED MOTIONS FOR SANCTIONS WHICH
REQUESTED SANCTIONS OR AN ORDER TO COMPEL FILED ON OR
ABOUT SEPTEMBER 1, 2011 AND THE ASSOCIATED ORDERS ON
MOTION DATED NOVEMBER 4, 2011 AND FILED ON OR ABOUT
NOVEMBER 23, 2011.
Respondents allege that the Industrial Commission does not have jurisdiction over

the Respondent and was therefore not subject to the Subpoena and or Notice of Deposition
served upon his attorney of records as he was outside the State of Idaho. If this argument
is the prevailing argument, then the Respondent's briefs and answer should be stricken as
he is no longer subject to the jurisdiction. Respondent can not have his cake by not
appearing and to eat it to have his attorney appear and argue his case. This especially
unfair and unjust to the Appellant when the burden is on the Appellant to prove his case
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and the information and testimony in the possession of the Respondent who refuses to
appear telephonically or otherwise.

The arguments of the Respondent that he is not

subject to the jurisdiction supports Appellant's claim that default should be entered and
Respondent's briefs be stricken.
However, if this court believes that default should not be entered against the
Respondent, the Respondent should not be able to avoid jurisdiction under grounds of
public policy and established law. First, allowing a party from refusing to appear, testify,
provide records or otherwise participate in the workers compensation because they have
left the state of Idaho would be against public policy as it would lead to employers
intentionally leaving the state to avoid claimants from obtaining records and testimony
necessary for the claimant.
Second, Idaho State 5-514 clarifies that Respondent employer voluntarily subjected
himself to the jurisdiction to the state of Idaho by transacting business and ensuring the
Appellant in the state ofIdaho. Idaho Statute 5-514 states as follows:

§ 5-514. Acts subjecting persons to jurisdiction of courts of state.
Any person, firm, company, association or corporation, whether or not a citizen or
resident of this state, who in person or through an agent does any of the acts
hereinafter enumerated, thereby submits said person, firm, company, association or
corporation, and if an individual, his personal representative, to the jurisdiction of
the courts of this state as to any cause of action arising from the doing of any of
said acts:
The transaction of any business within this state which is hereby defined
as the doing of any act for the purpose of realizing pecuniary benefit or
accomplishing or attempting to accomplish, transact or enhance the business
purpose or objective or any part thereof of such person, firm, company, association
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or corporation;
The commission of a tortious act within this state;
The ownership, use or possession of any real property situate within this
state;
Contracting to insure any person, property or risk located within this state at
the time of contracting;
See also, Schneider v. Sverdsten Logging Co., 657 P.2d 1078 (Idaho 1983)
Respondent Employer further subjected himself to the jurisdiction of the court by
appearing and defending the case through his attorney; had the court not obtained
jurisdiction over the Respondent employer, the Industrial Commission's decision would be
Void. Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure 5(b)(F) allows service upon a party by service upon
the attorney of the party via fax.
The most important key to a contested case is the testimony of disinterested
witnesses to establish whether Appellant was injured on the job on the 10th of September
2010 or not. Appellant sought in discovery and the Respondent Employer failed and
refused to answer discovery and failed and refused to appear at his deposition wherein the
hearing officer Ordered the Respondent Employer to provide the current address, i-9 and
contact for the employees that were working with the Appellant the week of his injury.
Defendants acknowledged in Defendants' Response to Claimant's Second Verified Motion
for Sanction (Agency Record, 45) that "These responding defendants do acknowledge the
fact that, to date, the list of employees working for the defendant employer during the time
period of September 5-26, 2010 have not yet been provided."
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Notwithstanding the assertions and productions by the Respondents in discovery by
counsel, the record is replete from any assertions from the Respondent Employer at the
hearing, through affidavit or otherwise that they provided the records requested in
Discovery and Ordered. Further, the record clarifies that the Respondent Employer failed
and refused to attempt to locate and or tender the current address, i-9 and employment
records for the employees that were working the week of Appellant's accident.
Respondent employer Roberto Corral, Sr. (President), Corral Agriculture, Inc
(Records Custodian), Jorge Coronado (Supervisor) failed to timely answer discovery and
failed and refused to appear at the time set for deposition set for the 1st of September 2011
and the Defendants Roberto Corral Sr (President) and Luisa Corral (Secretary) failed to
appear at trial despite subpoenas being issued signed by the Industrial Commission on the
23 rd of January 2012.

(Claimant's Exhibit 23-24, Hearing Transcript 355) (Agency

Record, 8-18, 38-43).

Roberto Corral, Jr. even admitted at the hearing that Roberto

Corral, Sr. would have been one of the best employees to find out and provide evidence of
which employees were actually there working with Appellant during the time of the
accident. (Hearing Transcript 335:8-22)
Roberto Corral, Jr. was the vice president of Corral Agriculture, Inc. (Hearing
Transcript, 340:16-17) and Roberto Corral, Sr. was the president of Corral Agriculture,
Inc. at the time of accident herein; Roberto Corral, Sr. was incarcerated and deported and
Corral Agriculture, Inc. was administratively dissolved January 13, 2012 wherein Roberto
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Corral, Jr. incorporated "Corral AG Labor, Inc" and at his deposition admitted that
employees that were working with the Claimant in 2010 returned to work for Roberto
Corral, Jr. at Corral AG Labor, Inc, the new business, and that he had not requested the
payroll records from his agent "Ashmead and Associates in Nampa" to locate or obtain the
updated current address or contact information of the employees. (Deposition of Roberto
Corral Jr., 5:21 - 6:3)

(Claimant's Exhibit 17) (See also Idaho Secretary of State,

Business Entity) (Hearing Transcript offer of proof, 337:2 - 340:6)
Roberto Corral, Jr. also admitted at the hearing that even as of the date of the
hearing he had failed and refused to investigate his telephone records to determine
communications with the Appellant after the accident to prove or disprove notice or
whether the line was disconnected. (Hearing Transcript 327:12-25; 332: 19-25)
Defendant's incomplete and untimely disclosure on the 15th of December 2011
with outdated 1-9 addresses of the employees did not contain any current address in the
possession of Defendant and the vice president of the company
Due the inaction of the Respondent Employer and the decision of the hearing
officer, Appellant was left at trial without the most important key to meet his burden, the
current address of the half dozen workers that were present on the 10th of September 2010.
Appellant was able to obtain letters from two workers, but the workers refused to provide
Appellant their address to serve subpoenas.
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Therefore, the Respondent should have either been sanctioned for not appearing
and withholding testimony and records that Appellant needed, or default should have been
entered as he was not subject to its jurisdiction.
XII.

THE COMMISSION DID NOT HAVE SUBSTANTIAL AND
COMPETENT EVIDENCE TO DENY MR. FONSECA'S CLAIM
BECAUSE IT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT FAILED TO
ENFORCE ITS ORDER TO COMPEL DISCOVERY AND THE
COMMISSION DID NOT ACCOUNT FOR EVIDENCE PRESENTED.

The court in Stevens-McAtee v. Potlatch Corp., 145 Idaho 325 (2008) reversed the
ruling and finding of the referee decision regarding credibility of the Claimant. Because
the Court found that the Commission's findings on McAtee's substantive credibility were
not supported by substantial and competent evidence, the Court was not bound by those
findings on appeal and may review the factual record in a light independent of those
findings.

McAtee clarified that an element to support of lack of credibility when the

claimant's testimony contradicts with it self and improves or enhances over time
substantially and will be upheld if the facts support such.
While recognizing that the referee and the Industrial Commission regularly make
determination of credibility when there is conflicting testimony from two witnesses; the
Appellant provided testimony and evidence that was not conflicted or changed over time.
Appellant consistently testified that he was working picking apples on a ladder at the
orchard with half a dozen employees which was substantiated by the employment records
and such testimony was supported by his medical provider to support his contention of the
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accident, that he was injured when he fell from the ladder, and that he went horne early.
(See citations above which are incorporated herein from Appellant's Final Reply Brief, pp
8-12.)
The Respondents allege that Appellant's substantive credibility is highly suspect
due to "inaccuracies or conflicting facts" without providing any conflicting testimonies
that are relevant or substantive to the case at hand. Further, the Respondents allege that
Appellant must not be credible because his testimony differed from those of the
Respondent and their contractor who had a relationship and bias in favor of the
Respondent.
The Respondent and the Industrial Commission discount the testimony of the
Appellant because his testimony regarding facts that occurred after the accident differs
from the memory of the Respondent employer. However, the record is vacant of any
contradictory testimony of Appellant regarding being injured and when being injured.
Respondent allege that Appellant was untruthful when his testimony differed from Jorge
Coronado without accounting for the fact that Jorge Corondao finally admitted, contrary to
his previous testimony under oath, that Mr. Coronado did not start working at the
Williamson Orchard until the September 17 or 18, 2010, one week after the accident.
(T.H. 291:1 -13)(C15;5:10 - 18)
The referee and Industrial Commission failed to address the fact that Roberto
Corral Jr. was the vice president of the company over finances when Roberto Corral Sr.
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lost his legal permanent residence and was deported due to a felony conviction after tax
problems (TH 335:23 - 336:1; 339:8 - 340:6); and that the referee disallowed any further
testimony regarding such despite allowing testimony regarding criminal history of the
Appellant to be admitted.
CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Mr. Fonseca respectfully requests that this Court either
reverse the order of the Commission, or

remand his case to the Commission with

instructions to reopen his case to consider evidence consistent with Appellant's herein.
Appellant further request costs and fees for the Appeal Reply Brief herein as previously
requested and under IRCP S4(e)(1) and Idaho Code 12-12l.
DATED this Snd day of August.
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this 5th day of August 2013 I delivered a true and correct
copy of the foregoing BRIEF OF THE CLAIMANT/APPELLANT to the following via
hand delivery and facsimile:

David J. Lee
Idaho State Insurance Fund
1215 W State Street
Boise, ID 83720
Fax No.: 208-332-2225

By:---Y~~~~~-Rich
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